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Abstract
Numerical possibility measures can be interpreted as systems of upper betting rates for
events. As such, they have a special part in the unifying behavioural theory of imprecise
probabilities, proposed by Walley. On this interpretation, they should arguably satisfy
certain rationality, or consistency, requirements, such as avoiding sure loss and coherence.
Using a version of Walley’s notion of epistemic independence suitable for possibility
measures, we study in detail what these rationality requirements tell us about the con-
struction of independent product possibility measures from given marginals, and we
obtain necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a product to satisfy these criteria. In par-
ticular, we show that thewell-knownminimumandproduct rules for forming independent
joint distributions from marginal ones, are only coherent when at least one of these dis-
tributions assume just the values zero and one.
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1. Introduction
Possibility theory, as originated by Zadeh [19], can be described as collection
of notions and techniques centered around the concept of a possibility measure. It
is mainly used for the representation and manipulation of so-called linguistic
uncertainty, produced by (potentially vague) statements in natural language. It
was conceived as an alternative to probability theory, which, according toZadeh,
does not lend itself very well to modelling linguistic uncertainty. In parallel with
probability theory, notions such as possibility integrals, product possibility
measures, conditional possibility measures and possibilistic independence have
been developed [2,6,7]. Possibility measures have also been studied under dif-
ferent names and guises, and in other contexts, see for instance [1,9,10,13,14].
In recent years, quite some eﬀort has been invested in the study of possibility
measures in the framework of the theory of imprecise probabilities [15]. In this
approach, the possibility of some event is given the behavioural interpretation
of a subject’s upper probability, or upper betting rate, for the event, i.e., the
inﬁmum rate at which the subject is willing to take bets on the event, or
equivalently, one minus the supremum rate at which he is willing to bet against
it. A possibility measure then represents a collection of such upper betting
rates. Because specifying an upper betting rate amounts to a commitment
to act (bet) in certain ways, upper probabilities and in particular possibility
measures are subject to a number of rationality, or consistency, requirements,
called avoiding sure loss and coherence. It turns out that normal possibility
measures satisfy these requirements, and can therefore be considered as rea-
sonable imprecise probability models [3–5,16]. So can (precise) probability
measures. This points to a distinct advantage of the unifying approach using
the theory of imprecise probabilities: it allows the comparison of both types of
measures in a single framework, using a common language and the same
(behavioural) interpretation. This has for instance been done in a recent study
[18], where it is argued that possibility measures indeed seem to be better suited
for modelling linguistic uncertainty than probability measures.
This being said, it is by no means obvious that all of what is commonly
understood as ‘possibility theory’ will get similar backing from the theory of
imprecise probabilities: the rationality criteria of avoiding sure loss and co-
herence can for instance be used to weed out those notions and techniques
which are inconsistent with the behavioural interpretation of possibility mea-
sures as upper probabilities. To give an example, in contradistinction to
probability theory, a large variety of rules have been proposed for conditioning
a possibility measure (see for instance the overviews in [2,7,17]). In a recent
paper [17], Walley and De Cooman have shown that most of these rules
avoid sure loss, but do not satisfy the stricter requirement of coherence. They
have also suggested a number of new conditioning rules that guarantee co-
herence.
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Two variables are said to be epistemically independent to a subject when new
knowledge about the value that one variable assumes, does not change his
beliefs about the value the other variable takes [15, Chapter 9]. In the present
paper, we study some aspects of this notion of independence for possibility
measures. More speciﬁcally, we investigate what the rationality criteria of
avoiding sure loss and coherence tell us about the construction of independent
joint possibility measures from given marginal ones.
We have organised the paper as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy review
deﬁnitions and basic results concerning the interpretation of possibility mea-
sures as upper betting rates, necessary for understanding much of what follows.
In Section 3, we formulate a deﬁnition of epistemic independence inspired
by Walley’s original deﬁnition [15], and suitable in a ‘possibilistic’ context. We
also derive a necessary and suﬃcient condition, in terms of sets of dominated
probability measures, for the consistency of a joint possibility measure with its
marginals, under the epistemic independence assumption. This condition is
quite complicated, but we show in Section 4 that it can be simpliﬁed signiﬁ-
cantly when one of the marginal possibility measures is unimodal: we obtain a
characterisation of the coherent product possibility measures through an upper
bound. The study for the plurimodal case seems to be much harder, and we
present a simpliﬁed suﬃcient, and a diﬀerent necessary, condition for coher-
ence under the epistemic independence assumption in Section 5. Section 6
concludes the paper with additional discussion.
This paper is an updated and expanded version of a paper [11] presented at
ISIPTA’01, the Second International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities
and their Applications.
2. Preliminary notions and results
A possibility measure P on a ﬁnite 1 set X is a map deﬁned on the power set
}ðXÞ of X and taking values in the real unit interval ½0; 1, that satisﬁes
Pð;Þ ¼ 0 and that is moreover maxitive: for all subsets A and B of X,
PðA [ BÞ ¼ maxfPðAÞ;PðBÞg. It is completely determined by its (possibility)
distribution p : X ! ½0; 1, deﬁned by pðxÞ ¼ PðfxgÞ for all x 2 X. Indeed, we
have PðAÞ ¼ maxfpðxÞ : x 2 Ag for any non-empty subset A of X.
Possibility measures can be incorporated into the behavioural theory of
imprecise probabilities [15] by interpreting them as upper probabilities: for any
event A  X, PðAÞ is then a subject’s upper probability of A, i.e., his inﬁmum
acceptable rate for taking bets on A, or one minus his supremum acceptable
rate for betting against A. This means that the subject is disposed to accept a
1 We only deal with possibility measures on ﬁnite sets in this paper.
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bet whose outcome is x 1 if A occurs, and x if A does not occur, for all
x > PðAÞ. It turns out [3,4,16] that a possibility measure P with this inter-
pretation satisﬁes the rationality criteria of avoiding sure loss and coherence 2
if and only if it is normal, i.e., if PðXÞ ¼ 1. We shall therefore only consider
normal possibility measures in what follows. Normality implies that the dis-
tribution p has at least one mode (or modal value) xo, for which pðxoÞ ¼ 1. If
there is only one such mode, then p (and P) is called unimodal. A distribution
with more than one mode is called plurimodal.
Consider two variablesX andY taking values in the respective ﬁnite setsX and
Y. We only consider the interesting case that bothX andY have more than one
element. We assume that a subject has certain beliefs about which values these
variables assume, and that he models these beliefs using a possibility measure
PX ;Y onXY, with distribution pX ;Y . 3 ForC  XY,PX ;Y ðCÞ is the subject’s
upper probability for the event that ðX ; Y Þ assumes a value in C, and for
ðx; yÞ 2 XY, pX ;Y ðx; yÞ is his upper probability that ðX ; Y Þ assumes the value
ðx; yÞ.
The marginals PX and PY of the so-called joint possibility measure PX ;Y are
deﬁned as follows. PX is deﬁned on X by PX ðAÞ ¼ PX ;Y ðAYÞ. It is a pos-
sibility measure on X, and PX ðAÞ represents the subject’s upper probability
that the variable X assumes a value in A  X (regardless of what value Y
takes). Similarly, the possibility measure PY is deﬁned on Y by PY ðBÞ ¼
PX ;Y ðX BÞ; and PY ðBÞ is the subject’s upper probability that Y takes a value
in B  Y. We denote the possibility distributions of PX and PY by pX and pY
respectively.
Conditional possibility measures [2,3,6,7] can be given the behavioural in-
terpretation of updated upper probabilities [3,17]. PX jY ðAjyÞ is then interpreted
as the subject’s inﬁmum acceptable rate for taking bets on, or one minus his
supremum rate for betting against, the event that X assumes a value in A  X,
after learning only that Y takes the value y 2 Y; and similarly for PY jX ðBjxÞ.
For each x 2 X, PY jX ðjxÞ is assumed to be a possibility measure on Y, with
distribution pY jX ðjxÞ; and for each y 2 Y, PX jY ðjyÞ is assumed to be a possi-
bility measure on X, with distribution pX jY ðjyÞ. 4
Since on a behavioural interpretation, the joint and the conditional possi-
bility measures represent a subject’s dispositions to act in certain ways, they
should satisfy certain rationality requirements, not only separately (they should
2 We assume that the reader is familiar with these basic consistency requirements in the theory of
imprecise probabilities. See [3,4,15,16] for more details.
3 A speciﬁc and interesting case where this assumption makes sense, is discussed in [18].
4 We only consider the case that the subject’s conditional upper probabilities are possibility
measures as well. This is perfectly compatible with the epistemic independence assumption to be
introduced and studied later.
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all be normal!) but also taken together. A thorough discussion of such criteria
in the general context of imprecise probabilities was given by Walley [15]. The
special case of possibility measures was discussed by Walley and de Cooman
[17], who also investigated which of a large number of so-called conditioning
rules for possibility measures, available in the literature, satisfy these criteria.
We refer to their work for both motivation and mathematical development.
For the purposes of the present paper, it will suﬃce to recall the following
characterisation of the criteria of avoiding sure loss and of coherence of the
joint and conditional possibility distributions (or equivalently, measures) in
terms of sets of dominated probability measures. It can be easily inferred from
Lemma 3 and the proof of Theorem 1 in [17]. LetMc be the set of probability
measures deﬁned on the power set of XY and satisfying the following in-
equalities:
ðC1Þ P ðAÞ6PX ;Y ðAÞ for all A  XY; and
ðC2Þ P ðB fygÞ=P ðX fygÞ6PX jY ðBjyÞ for all B  X and y 2 Y such that
P ðX fygÞ > 0; and
ðC3Þ P ðfxg  CÞ=P ðfxg YÞ6PY jX ðCjxÞ for all C  Y and x 2 X such that
P ðfxg YÞ > 0.
Theorem 1. The joint possibility distribution pX ;Y and the conditional possibility
distributions fpY jX ðjxÞ : x 2 Xg and fpX jY ðjyÞ : y 2 Yg avoid sure loss if and
only ifMc is non-empty. They are coherent if and only if there is a non-empty set
M of probabilities defined on the power set of XY such that:
1. PX ;Y ðAÞ ¼ supfP ðAÞ : P 2Mg for all A  XY.
2. PX jY ðBjyÞP supfP ðB fygÞ=P ðX fygÞ : P 2M; P ðX fygÞ > 0g for all
B  X and y 2 Y, with equality when bðyÞ ¼ maxfpY ðvÞ : v 6¼ yg < 1.
3. PY jX ðCjxÞP supfPðfxg  CÞ=P ðfxg YÞ : P 2M; P ðfxg YÞ > 0g for all
C  Y and x 2 X, with equality when gðxÞ ¼ maxfpX ðuÞ : u 6¼ xg < 1.
If there is such a set M, then Mc is the largest such set.
A few remarks are in order here. Strictly speaking, this theorem gives a
characterisation of the rationality conditions of avoiding uniform sure loss, and
of weak coherence, respectively. Walley [15, Section 7.1] also discusses the
generally more stringent rationality conditions of avoiding partial loss and
(strong) coherence. But we have shown elsewhere [12] that, for general upper
probabilities, under the conditions of epistemic independence to be discussed
further on, the weak and strong coherence of joint and marginal upper
probabilities in fact turn out to be equivalent, and that the same holds for
avoiding partial loss and avoiding uniform sure loss. For these reasons, we
have restricted ourselves here to the characterisation of the weaker notions: this
turns out to be suﬃcient, but it is a lot easier to do. In order not to burden our
terminology too much, we shall simply refer to them as ‘avoiding sure loss’ and
‘coherence’.
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There is a simple necessary condition for the coherence of pX ;Y ,
fpY jX ðjxÞ : x 2 Xg and fpX jY ðjyÞ : y 2 Yg, which was shown in [17] to be the
following:
pX ;Y ðx; yÞ6 pX jY ðxjyÞpY jX ðyjxÞmaxfpX ðxÞ; pY ðyÞgpX jY ðxjyÞ þ pY jX ðyjxÞ  pX jY ðxjyÞpY jX ðyjxÞ ð1Þ
for all x 2 X and y 2 Y, where 0=0 is taken to be 0. As mentioned in [17], the
inequality (1) is a special case of a condition valid in general for upper prob-
abilities. It will play a central part in what follows.
3. Epistemic independence and coherence
We are now ready to address the question that will occupy us in the rest of
the paper. Assume that our subject has beliefs (or information) about the
values assumed by the variables X and Y separately, and that he has modelled
his beliefs in the form of the marginal possibility distributions pX and pY . He
also judges the variables X and Y to be epistemically 5 independent: he judges
that new information about the value of one variable will not aﬀect his beliefs
about the value the other variable assumes. We intend to investigate what this
independence assumption, together with the rationality requirements of
avoiding sure loss and coherence, tells us about the joint distribution pX ;Y ,
which models the subject’s beliefs about the values X and Y assume jointly.
For probability measures (on ﬁnite spaces), the judgement of epistemic in-
dependence together with coherence leads uniquely to the product probability
measure of the marginals [15, Section 9.3.2]. We shall see that there is no
uniqueness in the case of possibility measures: for given marginals, there is
generally more than one joint possibility distribution that satisﬁes the inde-
pendence and coherence requirements. Our aim is to characterise such joint
distributions in a manner that is as simple as possible.
The ﬁrst step we have to take is to apply the notion of epistemic indepen-
dence, formulated by Walley for general imprecise models [15, Section 9] to the
case that beliefs are represented by possibility distributions.
Deﬁnition 1. We say that Y is irrelevant to X when pX jY ðxjyÞ ¼ pX ðxÞ for all
x 2 X and y 2 Y. We say that X and Y are epistemically independent when X is
irrelevant to Y and Y is irrelevant to X.
5 There is more than one independence concept in possibility theory, see for instance [2,7]. Here,
we use a version of Walley’s notion of epistemic independence [15], because it has the most natural
interpretation in the behavioural context of the theory of imprecise probabilities.
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Given the marginal distributions pX and pY , the judgement of epistemic
independence leads at once to values for the conditional distributions
fpX jY ðjyÞ : y 2 Yg and fpY jX ðjxÞ : x 2 Xg. We now only have to require that
the joint pX ;Y (which has marginals pX and pY ) should be consistent with these
conditional distributions.
Deﬁnition 2. We say that the normal joint possibility distribution pX ;Y avoids
sure loss under epistemic independence when the joint distribution and the
conditional possibility distributions fpY jX ðjxÞ : x 2 Xg and fpX jY ðjyÞ : y 2 Yg
given by
pX jY ðxjyÞ ¼ pX ðxÞ and pY jX ðyjxÞ ¼ pY ðyÞ ð2Þ
for all x 2 X and y 2 Y, avoid sure loss. Similarly, we say that the joint dis-
tribution pX ;Y is coherent under epistemic independence when these possibility
distributions are coherent. In that case, pX ;Y will be called an independent joint
distribution, or an independent product of its marginals pX and pY .
It turns out that the ﬁrst consistency condition under epistemic indepen-
dence is always satisﬁed. The second condition is more involved, however. To
see this, consider the set Mi (the counterpart of the set Mc in the previous
section) of probability measures deﬁned on the power set of XY and sat-
isfying the following inequalities:
ðCI1Þ P ðAÞ6PX ;Y ðAÞ for all A  XY; and
ðCI2Þ P ðB fygÞ=P ðX fygÞ6PX ðBÞ for all B  X and y 2 Y such that
P ðX fygÞ > 0; and
ðCI3Þ P ðfxg  CÞ=P ðfxg YÞ6PY ðCÞ for all C  Y and x 2 X such that
P ðfxg YÞ > 0.
Applying Theorem 1 leads to the following result, which is the starting point
for the further development. 6
Theorem 2. A normal joint possibility distribution pX ;Y always avoids sure loss
under epistemic independence, or in other words, Mi 6¼ ;. It is coherent under
epistemic independence if and only if there is a non-empty set of probabilities M
defined on the power set of XY such that:
1. PX ;Y ðAÞ ¼ supfP ðAÞ : P 2Mg for all A  XY.
2. PX ðBÞP supfPðB fygÞ=PðX fygÞ : P 2M; P ðX fygÞ > 0g for all
B  X and y 2 Y, with equality when bðyÞ < 1.
6 It turns out that the ﬁrst part of Theorem 2 holds for general imprecise probability models: any
(separately) coherent joint upper prevision avoids sure loss under independence. See [12] for more
details.
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3. PY ðCÞP supfP ðfxg  CÞ=P ðfxg YÞ : P 2M; Pðfxg YÞ > 0g for all
C  Y and x 2 X, with equality when gðxÞ < 1.
If there is such a set M, then Mi is the greatest such set.
Proof. The coherence part follows immediately from Theorem 1. The same
theorem tells us that pX ;Y avoids sure loss under epistemic independence if and
only if Mi 6¼ ;. It therefore only remains to show that Mi 6¼ ;. Consider
ðx; yÞ 2 XY such that pX ;Y ðx; yÞ ¼ 1, and consequently pX ðxÞ ¼ pY ðyÞ ¼ 1
(there always are such x and y, since pX ;Y is normal). Deﬁne the (degenerate)
probability measure P on the power set of XY by P ðx; yÞ ¼ 1. Then it is easy
to see that P 2Mi. 
We can also take a look at the necessary condition for coherence (1),
mentioned in the previous section. Using the epistemic independence relation
(2), we ﬁnd
pX ;Y ðx; yÞ6 pX ðxÞpY ðyÞmaxfpX ðxÞ; pY ðyÞgpX ðxÞ þ pY ðyÞ  pX ðxÞpY ðyÞ ðNCÞ
for all x 2 X and y 2 Y, where 0=0 is taken to be 0. This is a very simple
necessary condition for the coherence under epistemic independence of pX ;Y ,
expressed only in terms of the local values pX ;Y ðx; yÞ, pX ðxÞ and pY ðyÞ of the
joint distribution and its marginals. We can easily deduce from this condition
certain properties that will be used repeatedly further on.
Lemma 3. If the normal joint distribution pX ;Y satisfies the necessary condition
(NC), then for all ðx; yÞ 2 XY:
1. pX ;Y ðx; yÞ6 pX ðxÞpY ðyÞ;
2. if 0 < pX ;Y ðx; yÞ ¼ pX ðxÞ, then pY ðyÞ ¼ 1;
3. if pY is unimodal with unique mode yo, then pX ðxÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðx; yoÞ.
4. if 0 < pX ðxÞ < 1 and 0 < pY ðyÞ < 1, then pX ;Y ðx; yÞ < pX ðxÞpY ðyÞ.
Proof. The proof of the fourth statement is similar to that of the ﬁrst, and the
second statement follows immediately from the ﬁrst. We therefore concentrate
on proving the ﬁrst and third statements. We may assume without loss of
generality that maxfpX ðxÞ; pY ðyÞg ¼ pX ðxÞ. In that case
maxfpX ðxÞ; pY ðyÞg
pX ðxÞ þ pY ðyÞ  pX ðxÞpY ðyÞ ¼
pX ðxÞ
pX ðxÞ þ pY ðyÞ  pX ðxÞpY ðyÞ 6
pX ðxÞ
pX ðxÞ ¼ 1
and consequently
pX ;Y ðx; yÞ6 pX ðxÞpY ðyÞmaxfpX ðxÞ; pY ðyÞgpX ðxÞ þ pY ðyÞ  pX ðxÞpY ðyÞ 6 pX ðxÞpY ðyÞ:
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To prove the third statement, observe that we may assume that pX ðxÞ > 0.
Then there is some y in Y such that pX ;Y ðx; yÞ ¼ pX ðxÞ, and the second state-
ment tells us that pY ðyÞ ¼ 1, whence y ¼ yo. 
In the rest of this section, we investigate how the necessary and suﬃcient
condition of Theorem 2 can be simpliﬁed. Our eﬀorts will culminate in The-
orem 8, which is the most important stepping stone for our investigation in the
following sections. First of all, in checking the coherence condition, the fol-
lowing lemma will be very useful, because it helps us verify whether a proba-
bility measure belongs to Mi or not. The proof is elementary, and therefore
omitted.
Lemma 4. Let m be the number of elements in X, and n the number of elements in
Y. Consider a probability measure P defined on the power set of XY.
1. Assume that the mn elements z ¼ ðx; yÞ ofXY are labeled in such a way that
pX ;Y ðz1Þ6 pX ;Y ðz2Þ6    6 pX ;Y ðzmnÞ. Then P satisfies condition ðCI1Þ if and
only if P ðz1Þ þ    þ P ðzjÞ6 pX ;Y ðzjÞ for j ¼ 1; . . . ; nm.
2. Assume that the m elements of X are labeled in such a way that pX ðx1Þ6
pX ðx2Þ6    6 pX ðxmÞ. Then P satisfies condition ðCI2Þ if and only if for all
y 2 Y such that PðX fygÞ > 0 and for j ¼ 1; . . . ;m,
P ðx1; yÞ þ    þ P ðxj; yÞ
P ðX fygÞ 6 pX ðxjÞ:
3. Assume that the n elements of Y are labeled in such a way that pY ðy1Þ6
pY ðy2Þ6    6 pY ðynÞ. Then P satisfies condition ðCI3Þ if and only if for all
x 2 X such that P ðfxg YÞ > 0 and for j ¼ 1; . . . ; n,
P ðx; y1Þ þ    þ P ðx; yjÞ
P ðfxg YÞ 6 pY ðyjÞ:
Interestingly, coherence under independence is not inﬂuenced by removing
from the set X elements x such that pX ðxÞ ¼ 0 and from the set Y elements y
such that pY ðyÞ ¼ 0. 7 To see this, consider the marginal sets
X0 ¼ fx 2 X : pX ðxÞ > 0g;
Y0 ¼ fy 2 Y : pY ðyÞ > 0g
and denote by P0X ;Y the restriction of PX ;Y to the power set ofX
0 Y0. With this
(normal) possibility measure, with possibility distribution p0X ;Y , we may asso-
ciate a set M0i of probability measures on the power set of X
0 Y0 satisfying
7 For our subject, it is practically impossible that the variables X and Y assume such values, since
he is disposed to bet at all odds against the event that they do.
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the (corresponding) properties ðCI1Þ  ðCI3Þ, which by Theorem 2 completely
determines the coherence under independence of the joint distribution p0X ;Y (or
the possibility measure P0X ;Y ).
Proposition 5.Mi satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2 if and only ifM0i satisfies
them, or in other words, the normal joint distribution pX ;Y is coherent under in-
dependence if and only if p0X ;Y is.
Proof. The proof is immediate if we observe that the elements ofMi and those
of M0i are in one-to-one correspondence, and that M
0
i consists of the restric-
tions to X0 Y0 of the probabilities in Mi. 
This implies that our results will remain valid if, instead of using condition
(2) to deﬁne epistemic independence, we use the alternative condition:
pX jY ðxjyÞ ¼ pX ðxÞ if pY ðyÞ > 0;
pY jX ðyjxÞ ¼ pY ðyÞ if pX ðxÞ > 0
for all ðx; yÞ 2 XY, which is sometimes found in the literature (see for in-
stance [8]).
Proposition 6. The set of probabilitiesMi satisfies the first condition of Theorem
2 if and only if for all ðx; yÞ in XY there is a P in Mi such that
P ðx; yÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðx; yÞ.
Proof.We ﬁrst show that the condition is suﬃcient. Indeed, for any A  XY,
there is some ðxA; yAÞ 2 A such thatPX ;Y ðAÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðxA; yAÞ, and the condition tells
us moreover that there is some P 2Mi such that P ðxA; yAÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðxA; yAÞ, whence
PX ;Y ðAÞ6 P ðAÞ. Since for all Q 2Mi, condition ðCI1Þ tells us that QðAÞ6
PX ;Y ðAÞ, we infer that PX ;Y ðAÞ ¼ maxfQðAÞ : Q 2Mig. Next, we show that the
condition is necessary. Consider ðx; yÞ 2 XY. IfMi satisﬁes the ﬁrst condition
of Theorem 2, then pX ;Y ðx; yÞ ¼ supfP ðx; yÞ : P 2Mig. Since Mi is obviously
closed in the natural topology, 8 this supremum is actually achieved for
some P 2Mi, or in other words, there is some P 2Mi such that P ðx; yÞ ¼
pX ;Y ðx; yÞ. 
Proposition 7. If the normal joint distribution pX ;Y satisfies the necessary con-
dition (NC), then the set Mi always satisfies the second and third conditions of
Theorem 2.
8 We identify the probabilities on XY with elements of Rnm in the obvious way, and consider
the topology generated by the Euclidean metric on Rnm.
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Proof. We show thatMi satisﬁes the second condition. The proof for the third
condition is completely similar (or symmetrical). It follows from ðCI2Þ that we
only need to prove that for all B  X:
PX ðBÞ ¼ sup P ðB fygÞP ðX fygÞ : P 2Mi; P ðX

 fygÞ > 0

; ð3Þ
when bðyÞ < 1. Let us suppose, therefore, that bðyoÞ < 1, or in other words that
pY is unimodal with unique mode yo. Consider B  X. Then there is some xB 2 B
such that PX ðBÞ ¼ pX ðxBÞ. If PX ðBÞ ¼ 1, it follows from Lemma 3 and the uni-
modality of pY that 1 ¼ pX ðxBÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðxB; yoÞ. The probability P uniquely de-
ﬁned on the power set ofXY by P ðxB; yoÞ ¼ 1 is easily shown to belong toMi
and to attain the desired equality. Let us therefore consider the case that
PX ðBÞ < 1. Let x0 be a modal point of the marginal distribution pX . Note that
x0 62 B so x0 6¼ xB. As pY is unimodal with unique mode yo, we must have
that pX ;Y ðx0; yoÞ ¼ 1. We also infer from Lemma 3 that pX ;Y ðxB; yoÞ ¼ pX ðxBÞ.
Consider the probability measure P uniquely deﬁned on the power set ofXY
by P ðxB; yoÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðxB; yoÞ and P ðx0; yoÞ ¼ 1 pX ;Y ðxB; yoÞ. We proceed to show
that P 2Mi. Observe that pX ;Y ðxB; yoÞ < pX ;Y ðx0; yoÞ ¼ 1, so Lemma 4 tells us that
P satisﬁes ðCI1Þ if and only if P ðxB; yoÞ6 pX ;Y ðxB; yoÞ, which holds by construction.
Next, observe that pX ðxBÞ < pX ðx0Þ ¼ 1. Since
P ðxB; yoÞ
P ðX fyogÞ ¼
pX ;Y ðxB; yoÞ
1
6 pX ðxBÞ
and P ðX fygÞ ¼ 0 for every y 2 Ynfyog, we may infer from Lemma 4 that P
satisﬁes ðCI2Þ. Since moreover pY ðyoÞ ¼ 1 we immediately infer from Lemma 4
that P satisﬁes ðCI3Þ as well. We may therefore indeed conclude that P 2Mi. It
is now obvious that
P ðB fyogÞ






so the second condition of Theorem 2 is satisﬁed. 
We may summarise these results in the following theorem.
Theorem 8. The normal joint distribution pX ;Y is coherent under independence if
and only if it satisfies (NC) and for all ðx; yÞ in XY there is some P inMi such
that P ðx; yÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðx; yÞ.
In checking whether the conditions of this theorem are veriﬁed, the fol-
lowing lemma will allow us to proceed somewhat faster.
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Lemma 9. Assume that the normal joint distribution pX ;Y satisfies condition (NC)
and let ðx; yÞ be an element of XY such that one of the following conditions is
satisfied:
1. pX ;Y ðx; yÞ ¼ 0;
2. maxfpX ðxÞ; pY ðyÞg ¼ 1;
3. 0 < pX ;Y ðx; yÞ and maxfpX ðxÞ; pY ðyÞg < 1, and there are x0 2 X and y0 2 Y
such that pX ;Y ðx0; yÞ ¼ pY ðyÞ, pX ;Y ðx; y0Þ ¼ pX ðxÞ and pX ;Y ðx0; y0Þ ¼ 1.
Then there is a P in Mi such that P ðx; yÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðx; yÞ.
Proof. Assume that the ﬁrst condition is satisﬁed. We know from the ﬁrst part
of Theorem 2 that Mi 6¼ ;. It follows from condition ðCI1Þ and pX ;Y ðx; yÞ ¼ 0
that P ðx; yÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðx; yÞ ¼ 0 for all P 2Mi.
Next, if the second condition holds, we may assume without loss of gener-
ality that pY ðyÞ ¼ 1. If pX ;Y ðx; yÞ ¼ 1, consider the (degenerate) probability
measure deﬁned on the power set of XY by P ðx; yÞ ¼ 1 ¼ pX ;Y ðx; yÞ. It is
easily veriﬁed that P 2Mi. If pX ;Y ðx; yÞ < 1, then there is some x0 6¼ x in X such
that pX ;Y ðx0; yÞ ¼ 1. Consider the probability measure P uniquely deﬁned on the
power set of XY by P ðx; yÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðx; yÞ and P ðx0; yÞ ¼ 1 pX ;Y ðx; yÞ. It re-
mains to be shown that P 2Mi. First of all, recall that pX ;Y ðx; yÞ6
pX ;Y ðx0; yÞ ¼ 1, so to prove that P satisﬁes ðCI1Þ, Lemma 4 tells us that we need
only verify that P ðx; yÞ6 pX ;Y ðx; yÞ, which holds by construction. Next, observe
that pX ðxÞ6 pX ðx0Þ ¼ 1 and that P ðX fvgÞ > 0 only if v ¼ y, so in order to
verify that P satisﬁes ðCI2Þ, Lemma 4 tells us that we need only verify that
P ðx; yÞ=P ðX fygÞ6 pX ðxÞ, or equivalently, pX ;Y ðx; yÞ=16 pX ðxÞ, which holds
trivially. Finally, since Pðu; vÞ > 0 only if v ¼ y, and since pY ðyÞ ¼ 1, we infer
from Lemma 4 that P also satisﬁes ðCI3Þ, so indeed P 2Mi.
To conclude the proof, let us assume that the third condition holds. Lemma
3 then tells us that pX ;Y ðx; yÞ < pX ðxÞpY ðyÞ. Consequently, there is some
a 2 ð0; 1Þ such that pX ;Y ðx; yÞ ¼ apX ðxÞpY ðyÞ. It also follows from the assump-
tion that pX ðx0Þ ¼ pY ðy0Þ ¼ 1 and therefore x0 6¼ x and y 0 6¼ y. We now deﬁne
the (ﬁnitely) additive set function P on the power set of XY by:
P ðx; yÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðx; yÞ;
P ðx; y 0Þ ¼ apX ðxÞ  pX ;Y ðx; yÞ;
P ðx0; yÞ ¼ apY ðyÞ  pX ;Y ðx; yÞ;
P ðx0; y0Þ ¼ 1 a½pX ðxÞ þ pY ðyÞ þ pX ;Y ðx; yÞ
and P ðu; vÞ ¼ 0 for all other ðu; vÞ 2 XY. We show that P is a probability. It
is clear that Pðx; yÞ þ P ðx; y0Þ þ P ðx0; yÞ þ P ðx0; y0Þ ¼ 1, so it remains to be
shown that all these terms are non-negative. First of all, it is obvious that
P ðx; yÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðx; yÞP 0. Moreover,
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and from the symmetry, we infer that also P ðx; y 0ÞP 0. Finally, since
a½pX ðxÞ þ pY ðyÞ  pX ;Y ðx; yÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðx; yÞ 1pX ðxÞ

þ 1
pY ðyÞ  1

¼ pX ;Y ðx; yÞ pX ðxÞ þ pY ðyÞ  pX ðxÞpY ðyÞpX ðxÞpY ðyÞ 6 1;
where the inequality follows from (NC), we see that P ðx0; y0Þ ¼ 1 a½pX ðxÞ
þpY ðyÞ þ pX ;Y ðx; yÞP 0. The proof is complete if we can show that P 2Mi. We
use Lemma 4. We may assume without loss of generality that pX ðxÞ6 pY ðyÞ,
whence pX ;Y ðx; yÞ < pX ;Y ðx; y0Þ6 pX ;Y ðx0; yÞ < pX ;Y ðx0; y 0Þ ¼ 1. Clearly, P ðx; yÞ ¼
pX ;Y ðx; yÞ and P ðx; yÞ þ P ðx; y0Þ ¼ apX ðxÞ6 pX ðxÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðx; y0Þ. Moreover,
P ðx; yÞ þ P ðx; y0Þ þ P ðx0; yÞ ¼ a½pX ðxÞ þ pY ðyÞ  pX ;Y ðx; yÞ
¼ pX ;Y ðx; yÞ pX ðxÞ þ pY ðyÞ  pX ðxÞpY ðyÞpX ðxÞpY ðyÞ
6 pY ðyÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðx0; yÞ;
where the inequality follows from (NC). We may then conclude from Lemma 4
that P satisﬁes ðCI1Þ. Next, observe that pX ðxÞ < pX ðx0Þ ¼ 1,
P ðx; yÞ
P ðX fygÞ ¼
pX ;Y ðx; yÞ
apY ðyÞ ¼ pX ðxÞ
and
P ðx; y 0Þ
P ðX fy0gÞ ¼
apX ðxÞ  pX ;Y ðx; yÞ
1 apY ðyÞ ¼ pX ðxÞ
apX ðxÞ  pX ;Y ðx; yÞ
pX ðxÞ  apX ðxÞpY ðyÞ
¼ pX ðxÞ apX ðxÞ  pX ;Y ðx; yÞpX ðxÞ  pX ;Y ðx; yÞ 6 pX ðxÞ:
For every v 2 Y diﬀerent from y and y0, we have that P ðX fvgÞ ¼ 0, so we
may conclude from Lemma 4 that P satisﬁes ðCI2Þ. The proof that P satisﬁes
ðCI3Þ is completely symmetrical. 
4. The unimodal case
It turns out that when at least one of the marginal distributions pX and pY is
unimodal, the conditions for coherence under epistemic independence, stated
in Theorem 8, simplify signiﬁcantly: in this case, the necessary condition (NC)
is also suﬃcient.
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Theorem 10. If the marginal distributions pX and pY are not both plurimodal, then
the normal joint distribution pX ;Y is coherent under epistemic independence if and
only if for all ðx; yÞ 2 XY:
pX ;Y ðx; yÞ6 pX ðxÞpY ðyÞmaxfpX ðxÞ; pY ðyÞgpX ðxÞ þ pY ðyÞ  pX ðxÞpY ðyÞ :
Proof. It is enough to check that the condition is suﬃcient. Assume therefore
that (NC) holds. It follows from Theorem 8 that pX ;Y is coherent under epis-
temic independence if and only if for all ðx; yÞ 2 XY there is some P 2Mi
such that P ðx; yÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðx; yÞ. This is what we now set out to prove. Let us
assume without loss of generality that pY is unimodal with unique mode yo, and
let ðx; yÞ be an arbitrary element of XY. Lemma 9 (conditions 1 and 2) tells
us that we may assume that 0 < pX ;Y ðx; yÞ and maxfpX ðxÞ; pY ðyÞg < 1. We
show that in this case condition 3 of Lemma 9 holds because of the unimodality
of pY , so that there is nothing left to prove. Indeed, there is some x0 2 X such
that pY ðyÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðx0; yÞ, whence we deduce that pX ðx0Þ ¼ 1 and therefore x0 6¼ x,
using Lemma 3. Similarly, there is some y0 2 Y such that pX ðxÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðx; y0Þ,
whence pY ðy 0Þ ¼ 1 and therefore y 0 ¼ yo, and y0 6¼ y. Also, there is some y00 2 Y
such that pX ;Y ðx0; y00Þ ¼ pX ðx0Þ ¼ 1, whence pY ðy00Þ ¼ 1, again by Lemma 3.
Therefore y00 ¼ y0 ¼ yo, and pX ;Y ðx0; y0Þ ¼ pX ;Y ðx0; yoÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðx0; y 00Þ ¼ 1. 
What we have in particular proven is that given two marginal possibility
distributions pX and pY , at least one of which is unimodal, the largest inde-
pendent product possibility distribution that is coherent, is given by
pX ;Y ðx; yÞ ¼ T ðpX ðxÞ; pY ðyÞÞ;
where T is the binary operator T : ½0; 12 ! ½0; 1 on the unit interval deﬁned by
T ða; bÞ ¼ abmaxfa; bg
aþ b ab
for all a and b in ½0; 1. The operator T is non-decreasing in both arguments,
and has unit 1 and zero 0, so it is a so-called triangular seminorm. It is
moreover continuous and commutative, but it is not a triangular norm, be-
cause it does not satisfy the associative property. To see this, take a ¼ 1=4,
b ¼ 1=2 and c ¼ 3=4; then T ða; T ðb; cÞÞ ¼ 81=1540 < 9=124 ¼ T ðT ða; bÞ; cÞ.
5. The general case
We now turn to the general case that both distributions pX and pY may be
plurimodal. The ﬁrst thing to note is that the result of the previous case cannot
be extended. To see this, consider the following counterexample.
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Example 1. Let X ¼ fa1; a2; a3g, Y ¼ fb1; b2; b3g and consider the normal joint
possibility distribution pX ;Y given by the following diagram:
where, of course, 06 b6 3=10. Since (NC) holds trivially for x and y such that
maxfpX ðxÞ; pY ðyÞg ¼ 1, we see that the necessary condition (NC) for coherence
under independence is satisﬁed provided that b6 T ð1=2; 3=10Þ ¼ 3=26. Assume
that pX ;Y is coherent under independence, which implies in particular that there
is a P 2Mi such that P ða1; b1Þ ¼ b, and which also implies that b6 3=26.
Assume in addition that b > 0, whence P ðfa1g YÞ > 0 and P ðX fb1gÞ > 0.
There is some a 2 ð0; 1Þ such that b ¼ apX ða1ÞpY ðb1Þ (use Lemma 3). Since
P ða1; b1Þ=P ðfa1g YÞ6 pY ðb1Þ because P 2Mi, it follows that P ðfa1g 
YÞP apX ða1Þ, whence
P ða1; b2ÞP apX ða1Þ  b ¼ apX ða1Þ½1 pY ðb1Þ:
This implies that P ðX fb2gÞ > 0. Consequently, it follows from Pða1; b2Þ=
P ðX fb2gÞ6 pX ða1Þ that
P ðX fb2gÞP P ða1; b2ÞpX ða1Þ P a½1 pY ðb1Þ:
We ﬁnd in a completely similar (or symmetrical) way that
P ðfa2g YÞP P ða2; b1ÞpY ðb1Þ P a½1 pX ða1Þ:
By combining these inequalities we ﬁnd that
P ða1; b1Þ þ P ða2; b1Þ þ P ða1; b2Þ þ Pða2; b3Þ þ P ða3; b2Þ
¼ Pða1; b1Þ þ P ðfa2g YÞ þ P ðX fb2gÞ







pY ðb1Þ þ 1

¼ b 2 pX ða1Þ  pY ðb1Þ þ pX ða1ÞpY ðb1Þ
pX ða1ÞpY ðb1Þ ;
pX ;Y b1 b2 b3 pX
a1 b 3=10 0 3=10
a2 1=2 0 1 1
a3 0 1 0 1
pY 1=2 1 1
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and if b > 1=9, or in other words, if
pX ;Y ða1; b1Þ > pX ða1ÞpY ðb1Þ
2 pX ða1Þ  pY ðb1Þ þ pX ða1ÞpY ðb1Þ ;
this contradicts the fact that P is a probability measure. We conclude that there
can be no coherence for b > 1=9!
This counterexample suggests a suﬃcient condition for independence and
coherence in the general case.
Theorem 11. If the normal joint distribution pX ;Y satisfies
pX ;Y ðx; yÞ6 min T ðpX ðxÞ; pY ðyÞÞ; pX ðxÞpY ðyÞ
2 pX ðxÞ  pY ðyÞ þ pX ðxÞpY ðyÞ
 
for all ðx; yÞ 2 XY, then it is coherent under epistemic independence.
Proof. Since (NC) is in particular satisﬁed, Theorem 8 tells us that we only have
to show that for every ðx; yÞ 2 XY there is some P 2Mi such that
P ðx; yÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðx; yÞ. We infer from Lemma 9 (conditions 1 and 2) that we may
assume that 0 < pX ;Y ðx; yÞ and maxfpX ðxÞ; pY ðyÞg < 1. Then there are x0 2 X
and y0 2 Y such that pX ;Y ðx0; yÞ ¼ pY ðyÞ and pX ;Y ðx; y0Þ ¼ pX ðxÞ. It follows from
the assumptions and Lemma 3 that pX ðx0Þ ¼ pY ðy0Þ ¼ 1, whence also x0 6¼ x and
y0 6¼ y. Lemma 9 (condition 3) tells us that we may assume that pX ;Y ðx0; y 0Þ < 1.
Consequently, there are x00 6¼ x0 in X and y00 6¼ y0 in Y such that pX ;Y ðx0; y 00Þ ¼
pX ;Y ðx00; y 0Þ ¼ 1. Note that pX ðx00Þ ¼ pY ðy 00Þ ¼ 1, so pX and pY are in this case
plurimodal, x00 6¼ x and y00 6¼ y. It also follows from the assumptions and
Lemma 3 that there is some a 2 ð0; 1Þ such that pX ;Y ðx; yÞ ¼ apX ðxÞpY ðyÞ. We
can assume without loss of generality that pX ðxÞ6 pY ðyÞ. Let P be the proba-
bility measure uniquely deﬁned on the power set of XY by P ðx; yÞ ¼
pX ;Y ðx; yÞ,
P ðx0; yÞ ¼ apY ðyÞ  pX ;Y ðx; yÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðx; yÞ 1 pX ðxÞpX ðxÞ ;
P ðx; y 0Þ ¼ apX ðxÞ  pX ;Y ðx; yÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðx; yÞ 1 pY ðyÞpY ðyÞ ;
P ðx0; y 00Þ ¼ a½1 pX ðxÞ  pY ðyÞ þ pX ;Y ðx; yÞ
¼ pX ;Y ðx; yÞ 1 pX ðxÞpX ðxÞ
1 pY ðyÞ
pY ðyÞ
and Pðx00; y0Þ ¼ 1 a. (It is easy to see that all these terms are non-negative and
add up to one.) It only remains to show that P 2Mi. We use Lemma 4. Recall
that pX ;Y ðx; yÞ6 pX ;Y ðx; y 0Þ6 pX ;Y ðx0; yÞ6 pX ;Y ðx0; y 00Þ ¼ pX ;Y ðx00; y 0Þ ¼ 1. Observe
that P ðx; yÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðx; yÞ and that
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P ðx; yÞ þ P ðx; y0Þ ¼ apX ðxÞ < pX ðxÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðx; y0Þ:
Also P ðx; yÞ þ P ðx; y0Þ þ Pðx0; yÞ is equal to
pX ;Y ðx; yÞ pX ðxÞ þ pY ðyÞ  pX ðxÞpY ðyÞpX ðxÞpY ðyÞ
and is therefore is dominated by pX ;Y ðx0; yÞ ¼ pY ðyÞ if and only if
pX ;Y ðx; yÞ6 pX ðxÞpY ðyÞ
2
pX ðxÞ þ pY ðyÞ  pX ðxÞpY ðyÞ ;
which is implied by the hypothesis. We may therefore conclude from Lemma 4
that P satisﬁes ðCI1Þ. Note also that P ðX fygÞ ¼ apY ðyÞ > 0, P ðX fy0gÞ > 0
and P ðX fy00gÞ ¼ P ðx0; y 00Þ > 0 and that PðX fvgÞ ¼ 0 for all other v 2 Y.
Since pX ðxÞ6 pX ðx0Þ ¼ pX ðx00Þ ¼ 1, P ðx; y00Þ ¼ 0,
P ðx; yÞ
P ðX fygÞ ¼
pX ;Y ðx; yÞ
apY ðyÞ ¼ pX ðxÞ;
and since it is easily veriﬁed that P ðx; y 0Þ=P ðX fy0gÞ6 pX ðxÞ if and only if
pX ;Y ðx; yÞ6 pX ðxÞpY ðyÞ
2þ pX ðxÞpY ðyÞ  pX ðxÞ  pY ðyÞ
which is implied by the hypothesis, we infer from Lemma 4 that P satisﬁes ðCI2Þ.
Similarly, note that P ðfxg YÞ ¼ apX ðxÞ > 0, P ðfx0g YÞ ¼ a½1 pX ðxÞ > 0
and P ðfx00g YÞ ¼ P ðx00; y 0Þ ¼ 1 a > 0 and that Pðfug YÞ ¼ 0 for all other
u 2 X. Since pY ðyÞ6 pY ðy 0Þ ¼ pY ðy00Þ ¼ 1, Pðx00; yÞ ¼ 0,
P ðx; yÞ
P ðfxg YÞ ¼
pX ;Y ðx; yÞ
apX ðxÞ ¼ pY ðyÞ;
and
P ðx0; yÞ
P ðfx0g YÞ ¼
pX ;Y ðx; yÞ 1pX ðxÞpX ðxÞ
pX ;Y ðx;yÞ
pX ðxÞpY ðyÞ ½1 pX ðxÞ
¼ pY ðyÞ;
we infer from Lemma 4 that P also satisﬁes ðCI3Þ, so we may indeed conclude
that P 2Mi. 
This theorem provides us with a suﬃcient condition for the coherence under
epistemic independence of possibility measures. The condition is not necessary,
however. To see this, it is enough to consider the case that (NC) holds and one
of the marginal distributions is unimodal, but where for some ðx; yÞ 2 XY,
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pX ðxÞpY ðyÞ
2 pX ðxÞ  pY ðyÞ þ pX ðxÞpY ðyÞ < pX ;Y ðx; yÞ
6 pX ðxÞpY ðyÞmaxfpX ðxÞ;pY ðyÞg
pX ðxÞ þ pY ðyÞ  pX ðxÞpY ðyÞ :
Then we deduce from Theorem 10 that pX ;Y is coherent under epistemic in-
dependence. Still, pX ;Y does not satisfy the condition given by the last theorem.
The condition is not necessary in the case that both marginals are plurimodal
either, as the following counterexample shows.
Example 2. Let X ¼ fa1; a2; a3g, Y ¼ fb1; b2; b3g and consider the normal joint
possibility distribution pX ;Y given by the following diagram:
where 1=9 < b < 3=26. Then pX ;Y ða1; b1Þ ¼ b does not satisfy the condition
stated on the previous theorem, as
pX ða1ÞpY ðb1Þ




We show that pX ;Y is nevertheless coherent under independence. Clearly, (NC) is
satisﬁed, as b < 3=26 ¼ T ð1=2; 3=10Þ. Consider ðx; yÞ 2 XY, then we show
that there is a P 2Mi such that P ðx; yÞ ¼ pX ;Y ðx; yÞ. It follows from Lemma 9
(conditions 1 and 2) that we may assume that pX ;Y ðx; yÞ > 0 and maxfpX ðxÞ;
pY ðyÞg < 1, so we need only look at x ¼ a1 and y ¼ b1. Note that pX ;Y ða1; b2Þ ¼
pX ða1Þ, pX ;Y ða2; b1Þ ¼ pY ðb1Þ and pX ;Y ða2; b2Þ ¼ 1 so Lemma 9 (condition 3) tells
us that there is a P 2Mi such that P ða1; b1Þ ¼ pX ;Y ða1; b1Þ ¼ b, and pX ;Y is co-
herent under independence.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have continued the study of the implications of giving
possibility measures a behavioural interpretation in terms of upper betting
rates, initiated in [3–5,16,17]. In particular, we have looked at the consequences
of the rationality requirements of avoiding sure loss and coherence when
forming independent products of marginal possibility measures. The deﬁnition
pX ;Y b1 b2 b3 pX
a1 b 3=10 0 3=10
a2 1=2 1 1 1
a3 0 1 0 1
pY 1=2 1 1
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of independence that was used here is based on Walley’s [15] notion of epis-
temic independence: two variables are epistemically independent for a subject
when his beliefs about the value taken by one variable are not inﬂuenced by
new knowledge about the value of the other variable. In the context of pos-
sibility theory, where beliefs are expressed in terms of possibility measures, it
seems natural to express epistemic independence in terms of the equality of
conditional and marginal possibility distributions (or measures), as we did in
Deﬁnition 1. We have obtained a simple characterisation for the coherence
under independence of a joint possibility distribution in the unimodal case, and
we have found a simple suﬃcient condition, as well as a diﬀerent, necessary one
in the plurimodal case. It is not clear to us whether in the general case, there is a
simple necessary and suﬃcient condition involving only the local values of the
joint and marginal possibility distributions.
An immediate conclusion of Lemma 3 is that the so-called minimum and
product rules for forming joint distributions from given marginals, which yield
pX ;Y ðx; yÞ ¼ minfpX ðxÞ; pY ðyÞg and pX ;Y ðx; yÞ ¼ pX ðxÞpY ðyÞ respectively, and
which are quite common in possibility theory (see for instance [2,6,7,19]), are
only coherent when pX and/or pY assume only the values 0 and 1.
We could also consider the so-called independent natural extension E [15,
Section 9.3] of two marginal possibility measuresPX andPY . This is the greatest
(least-committal or most conservative) coherent and independent joint upper
probability, which need not be a possibility measure. In fact, on products A B it
can be shown that EðA BÞ ¼ PX ðAÞPY ðBÞ, where A  X and B  Y [15,
Section 9.3.5]. E will therefore in general not be a possibility measure: if it were,
its distribution would be given by the product rule, which is generally not co-
herent!
The results in this paper indicate that the theory of imprecise probabilities has
useful things to say about independence in possibility theory. Butwe shouldwarn
the reader against too much optimism. Indeed, possibility measures are rather
imprecise uncertainty models: ifP is a normal possibility measure (and therefore
a coherent upper probability) on some set X, and N is its conjugate lower
probability, also called necessity measure, and deﬁned by NðAÞ ¼ 1PðcoAÞ,
where coA is the set-theoretic complement of A  X, then we have that
PðAÞ < 1 ) NðAÞ ¼ 0: the probability interval ½NðAÞ;PðAÞ always contains
zero or one (or both). Alternatively, it always holds for A  X that PðAÞ ¼ 1 or
PðcoAÞ ¼ 1, meaning that a subject whose beliefs are modelled by the upper
probabilityPwill not be disposed to bet againstA or against coA (unless perhaps
at the trivial rate zero!), and this for all A  X. On a behavioural interpretation,
possibilitymeasures thereforemodel fairly weak information states.On the other
hand, a judgement of independence is quite informative, and we suspect that in
some cases it will be too informative to be adequately modelled by possibility
measures, or within the context of possibility theory. This is illustrated by the fact
that, as we have seen above, the greatest independent joint possibility measure
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T ðPX ðAÞ;PY ðBÞÞ can be appreciably smaller than the independent natural ex-
tension EðA BÞ ¼ PX ðAÞPY ðBÞ on products A B: if we restrict ourselves to
possibilistic models, we are obliged, in order to capture independence, to use
products that may be signiﬁcantly more precise than if we had used a more
general approach, e.g., with coherent upper probabilities. This identiﬁes a
weakness in possibility theory.
References
[1] L.J. Cohen, The Probable and the Provable, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977.
[2] G. de Cooman, Possibility theory I–III, International Journal of General Systems 25 (1997)
291–371.
[3] G. de Cooman, Integration in possibility theory, in: M. Grabisch, T. Murofushi, M. Sugeno
(Eds.), Fuzzy Measures and Integrals – Theory and Applications, Physica-Verlag (Springer),
Heidelberg, 2000, pp. 124–160.
[4] G. de Cooman, D. Aeyels, Supremum preserving upper probabilities, Information Sciences
118 (1999) 173–212.
[5] G. de Cooman, D. Aeyels, A random set description of a possibility measure and its natural
extension, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics – Part A: Systems and
Humans 30 (2000) 124–130.
[6] D. Dubois, H. Prade, Possibility Theory, Plenum Press, New York, 1988.
[7] D. Dubois, H. Prade, Possibility theory: qualitative and quantitative aspects, in: Ph. Smets
(Ed.), Handbook on Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems, Quantiﬁed
Representation of Uncertainty and Imprecision, vol. 1, Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Dordrecht, 1998, pp. 169–226.
[8] H.J. Janssen, G. de Cooman, E.E. Kerre, Coherence of Dempster’s conditioning rule in
discrete possibilistic Markov models, International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and
Knowledge-Based Systems 8 (2000) 241–252.
[9] I. Levi, Potential surprise: its role in inference and decision making, in: L.J. Cohen, M. Hesse
(Eds.), Applications of Inductive Logic, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, pp. 1–27.
[10] D.K. Lewis, Counterfactuals and comparative possibility, Journal of Philosophical Logic 2
(1973).
[11] E. Miranda, G. de Cooman, Independent products of numerical possibility measures, in: G. de
Cooman, T.L. Fine, T. Seidenfeld (Eds.), ISIPTA ’01 – Proceedings of the Second
International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and their Applications, Shaker Publish-
ing, Maastricht, 2000, pp. 237–246.
[12] E. Miranda, G. de Cooman, Some comments on epistemic independence (in preparation).
[13] G.L.S. Shackle, Decision, Order and Time in Human Aﬀairs, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1961.
[14] N. Shilkret, Maxitive measures and integration, Indagationes Mathematicae 33 (1971) 109–
116.
[15] P. Walley, Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities, Chapman & Hall, London, 1991.
[16] P. Walley, Measures of uncertainty in expert systems, Artiﬁcial Intelligence 83 (1996) 1–58.
[17] P. Walley, G. de Cooman, Coherence of rules for deﬁning conditional possibility, International
Journal of Approximate Reasoning 21 (1999) 63–107.
[18] P. Walley, G. de Cooman, A behavioural model for linguistic uncertainty, Information
Sciences 134 (2001) 1–37.
[19] L.A. Zadeh, Fuzzy sets as a basis for a theory of possibility, Fuzzy Sets and Systems 1 (1978)
3–28.
42 E. Miranda, G. de Cooman / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 32 (2003) 23–42
